BIKE: The decline and fall of the American bicycle
Roger Baker
rcbaker
Thu Dec 2 23:21:36 PST 2004
CAMPO and CAMPO's director Mike Aulick have the foresight to understand
that bicycles are pathetic in importance compared to the real cars we
need to get around in the real city we live in. That is why CAMPO does
not even bother to gather data on bicycle use in the Austin area.
Bicycles will always be insignificant compared to the jet planes that
important high tech people will use to visit the giant future high tech
city of Austin that the CAMPO politicians all agree we will become in
the year 2030.
We must have the courage to go deeply into debt so as to pave our way
to prosperity by building the $184 billion in transportation corridors
that TxDOT, Gov Rick Perry, and the road contractors who contribute to
his campaign all understand is the key to the mighty Texas economy of
the future. Clicketh thou thither:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101041206-832224
-1,00.html
So what does it matter if we cannot compete in making steel, textiles,
cars, ships, machine tools, televisions, computers, hard drives,
petrochemicals, fertilizer, that we are outsourcing our service jobs,
or that we are only barely breaking even on our agricultural trade
nowadays?
None of that is very important so long as our moral-values President
has the courage to show the oil-producing regions of the world the
lessons they need to understand about fighting to defend their own
freedom at any cost. When you see it that way, the fact that the USA
can't still seem to make good bicycles at a price that American
customers are willing to pay seems pretty damn chickenshit, doesn't it?
-- Roger
********************************
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29737-2004Dec2.html
A Rough Ride for Schwinn Bicycle
As the World Economy Shifted, So Did the Fortunes of an American Classic
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 3, 2004; Page A01
MADISON, Wis. -- In the glass atrium that marks the entrance to the
Pacific Cycle company, the old and the new of the bicycle business are
displayed side by side. Each is called the Schwinn Sting Ray, and each
in its time has been a bestseller.
But the similarities end there. In the space of a generation,
everything about the process of designing, producing and selling a
Schwinn has changed.
The old Sting Ray broke the conventions of bicycle design, boasting a
banana seat, high handlebars and extra-wide tires. In the 1960s and
early '70s it became not only a symbol of middle-class aspirations, but
also a provider of thousands of jobs that paid good wages with health
and retirement benefits.
Today's model, which projects the rough look of a motorcycle, comes
from China, where the average factory worker makes less than a dollar
an hour. It is a symbol of a different sort -- an illustration of how
global economic forces and the sometimes clumsy responses of U.S.
companies transformed middle-class jobs into low-wage work both at home
and abroad.
In a nation that measures jobs in the tens of millions, changes to a
few thousand barely register. But when multiplied across a wide range
of industries, the rise and fall of companies such as Schwinn help
explain why the economy has become less forgiving of workers who lack
higher education or specialized skills.
"We're missing a big, important part of our society. Either everyone
has to go to college or everyone has to have very low-paying jobs,"
said Richard Schwinn, part of the fourth and last generation to run the
firm that bears his name. "I'm not sure that's a great balance."
The Schwinn Bicycle Co. went bankrupt in 1993 and sold off the brand.
But at its peak two decades earlier, the Schwinn family oversaw a labor
force of 2,000, the majority of whom never made it past high school.
Several thousand more U.S. workers benefited from jobs at Schwinn
dealerships, or in the steel and rubber factories that supplied parts.
Richard Schwinn, a large, bearded man with the bearing of a lumberjack,
now oversees an empire of 17 at a small custom bike factory in rural
Waterford, Wis.
About 75 miles away, in Madison, Pacific Cycle manages the Schwinn
brand from a sleek office with just 80 workers. Pacific, part of a
Canadian conglomerate, has a couple of hundred employees in California
warehouses, taking in the bikes imported from the seven Chinese
factories where most Schwinns are produced.
From California, the bikes fan out to mass merchants such as Wal-Mart.
Once there, cashiers making less than $10 an hour ring up the latest
Sting Ray at prices much cheaper than the original. Pacific sells more
than a quarter of all bikes purchased in the United States, with just
about 350 U.S. employees.
This is the outcome the Schwinn family had desperately sought to avoid.
But like many companies struggling to decipher how American production
and service workers fit in a globalized market, Schwinn erred badly.
Industry insiders say the family's dogged but ultimately flawed
determination to stay American-made contributed to its doom.
"They did a lot of things right over nearly 100 years," said Gary
Coffrin, an industry consultant. "But at the end, there were a lot of
things that caught up with them."
Building a Brand
The Schwinn factory jobs paid what in today's dollars would be around
the national average of $17 an hour, with benefits -- the kind of job
that has been getting increasingly difficult to find.
Many jobs disappear because their products or services become obsolete
-- think buggy whips -- but the world still needs bicycle makers. Just
not many American ones.
In 2002, 41.4 million Americans rode a bike six times or more. But 99
percent of the bikes sold in the United States today are imports. "It's
still a going industry," said Michael Kershow, former counsel for the
now defunct Bicycle Manufacturers Association of America. But in terms
of U.S. employment, "it's really a shadow of what it used to be."
Imports held only a sliver of the market when Schwinn dominated the
industry. It was founded in Chicago in the 1890s but rose to prominence
through Depression-era innovation that redefined the bicycle as both
durable and stylish. Its marketing genius was to cultivate a network of
small dealerships run by people who knew bikes, and who were eager to
promote the brand. Schwinn dealerships became a staple of downtowns,
typically employing a manager, a full-time worker or two and perhaps a
few teenagers in the summer.
As employment rose at Schwinn and other factories after World War II,
so did the fortunes of the middle class. From 1947 to 1979, median
family income more than doubled, from $21,201 to $45,989 in
inflation-adjusted terms. The gap between rich and poor narrowed, as
the middle 20 percent of families gained ground more rapidly than the
top 5 percent.
Frank Greco's family was one that benefited . He started on the
Schwinn assembly line at 25, grateful for the opportunity since he was
just back from the service and lacked a college degree. "They paid good
-- 80 cents an hour," he said.
Greco's fortunes improved with the company's. By 1950, Schwinns
accounted for one of every four bikes sold in the United States. Buying
a Schwinn became a sign of making it in the middle class, just like the
picket fence and the station wagon.
Greco stayed for 40 years, rising to become a foreman. "I made a
living. I bought my home. I raised my children. I got paid every week
for what I did. I told [then-chief executive] Edward Schwinn when I
retired, 'You don't owe me 2 cents,' " he said.
Schwinn was at its busiest in the early 1970s when a nascent
environmental movement coupled with a sudden exercise craze spawned a
bicycle boom. Dealers began making pilgrimages to Chicago to appeal for
more bikes.
"We could only build so many," said Jack Smith, the executive in
charge of distribution . "I'd tell them, 'I'd be glad to give you
more. But who am I going to take bikes away from to give them to you?'
"
Imports Roll In
As tastes began to change, however, Schwinn didn't. It continued to
churn out the same heavy, tough-to-maneuver bikes that had been the
mainstay of the industry for decades. "Durable? Yes. Lasts forever? You
bet," said Jay Townley, an industry consultant and former Schwinn
executive. "What the customer wanted? No."
Competitors like Mongoose became pioneers in the burgeoning BMX market,
while newcomers such as Specialized and Trek offered mountain bikes.
There were new entrants from abroad, as well. In the aftermath of the
bike boom, the tariffs on foreign bikes were lowered and it became
easier to import. Entrepreneurs in Korea, Japan, Taiwan and eventually
China, stood ready to feed American demand for ever-cheaper goods by
supplying components and whole bikes under U.S. brands, or their own.
Schwinn was among those that began to shift to foreign parts and
imported bikes. But in its initial forays into globalization, it got
burned badly. Its foreign suppliers, especially Taiwan-based Giant,
soon became its toughest competitors, applying Schwinn technology and
techniques to their own, cheaper lines. The Schwinn brand lost its
cachet, its bikes indistinguishable from many of the rest.
The total cost of just the parts for a Schwinn Varsity made in the
United States might have been $70, but a Taiwanese producer could
deliver the whole bike for that price, Richard Schwinn said. "Once that
came up, you say, 'Oh, party's over.' " Compounding the problem was
that Schwinn had failed to invest in its Chicago factory. It had become
a relic -- a rickety, fire-prone facility incapable of producing the
quantities of lightweight bikes that consumers demanded. In 1983,
Schwinn shut it down.
That decision foreshadowed a broader decline in U.S. manufacturing,
with the sector supplying 5 million fewer jobs today than at its peak
in 1979. Meanwhile, family income growth slowed, rising only about 15
percent over nearly a quarter-century. Americans without a college
degree -- who make up about three-quarters of the adult population --
now earn lower wages in real terms than they did a generation ago.
As it became clear the Chicago plant was doomed, the Schwinn family
made one last attempt to preserve its heritage as an American
manufacturer. While competitors focused their strategies overseas,
Schwinn opened a plant in Greenville, Miss., in 1981. The location was
no accident: A century earlier, Southern farmers migrated en masse to
northern cities like Chicago in search of steady factory work. Now
northern factory owners were looking south to traditionally
agricultural, anti-union areas where they could cheaply hire the
descendants of those farmers who had stayed behind.
The plant struggled from the beginning. Costs were high and the quality
uneven: The bikes coming off the assembly line in Greenville weren't
necessarily any better than the ones shipped from Asia. Wages may have
been low in Greenville compared with Chicago, but they were still
several times higher than those paid to laborers in China or Taiwan. As
the plant hemorrhaged money, Schwinn's leadership pulled the plug in
1991. The company declared bankruptcy two years later.
Tommy Hart, who ran the area's economic development office, managed to
acquire the last bike that rolled off the assembly line in Greenville.
He had coveted a Schwinn as a kid. But as his own son prepared to leave
for college, the pleading began: The bike would be perfect for getting
around campus. Couldn't he take it with him, if he promised to take
good care of it?
"I let him talk me into it," Hart said, sighing deeply.
It wasn't long before the bike was stolen.
"That was the last U.S.-made Schwinn bicycle," Hart said. "And the
crook doesn't have a clue. To him, it's just another bicycle."
The Road Not Taken
As Schwinn declined, another U.S. manufacturer moved into the breach .
Unlike nearly every other major bike company, the three-decade-old Trek
Bicycle Corp. still makes a considerable share of its bikes in the
United States -- any bike that costs more than $800, about 30 percent
of its production. At its Waterloo, Wis., headquarters, about half of
its 785 employees work in manufacturing, and the plant is expanding. An
additional 440 Trek employees work elsewhere in the United States.
Still, to make its expansion pay off, Trek will have to sail against
the trade winds; it makes a higher profit on its lower-end,
foreign-made products. "It's definitely getting tougher to compete. You
can get a complete bike offshore for what it costs us to weld one,"
said Zapata Espinoza, Trek's brand manager. "But being made in America
is not just about the warm feeling of giving jobs to people. We control
the process. We invented it. And we're doing it the best way we can by
keeping control of it."
For Schwinn, this is the road not taken, a model for how a company can
simultaneously retain at least some U.S. manufacturing and stay
competitive. Even though Trek's share of the total bike market is
small, it dominates among customers at the high end. Industry insiders
say a slimmer Schwinn with quality domestic manufacturing could have
joined Trek at the top. Instead, Schwinn got caught in the middle:
unwilling to move down to the mass-merchant level where most customers
now shop; unable to compete for serious riders willing to shell out top
dollar.
"Schwinn was in such a dominant position. It's shame on them," said
Chris Hornung, chief executive of Pacific Cycle. "They should have had
my business and Trek's business."
Instead, Hornung has Schwinn's business. He bought it out of bankruptcy
in 2001, the second time Schwinn had gone belly-up in less than 10
years.
Hornung's strategy has been simple: Import quality bikes from Asia. Get
them to mass merchants such as Wal-Mart. Keep payrolls to an absolute
minimum.
Since applying that strategy to Schwinn, the brand has lost the support
of most independent dealers, whose ranks are in decline. But it's been
a hit among mass merchants, with the Sting Ray expected to top many
kids' Christmas lists this season. "The bikes that we're putting the
Schwinn brand on and selling to Wal-Mart are absolutely the best bikes
that Wal-Mart has ever sold," Hornung said.
Grudgingly, Richard Schwinn has to agree. Reviving the Sting Ray, he
said, "is probably the coolest thing they've done."
Schwinn is fatalistic about the fall of his family's company. The
cause wasn't his family's mistakes, he insists, so much as the
worldwide pressure on prices to keep sinking lower, a phenomenon to
which he sees no end.
To many economists, this is how things should work, with efficiencies
making products cheaper and creating new opportunities at the high end
-- in building satellites, if not in bicycles. Schwinn is less sure the
trade-off is always worth it. What happens to a worker who has mastered
the art of welding a bike frame, but whose command of advanced physics
is shaky? "I know I have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness," he said, smiling wryly. "I didn't realize I had the right
to the lowest possible price."
And consumers do pay less for the new Sting Ray under Pacific's
ownership. It may not be the engineering marvel that was the old
Schwinn, but it retails at Wal-Mart for $180, about a third of the
original's price in today's dollars.
"People complain that a Schwinn is not what it was. True," said Greg
Blake, an engineer at Pacific.
"But," he said, "it doesn't cost what it did, either."
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